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The Autopoiesis of the Cold War:
An Evolutionary Approach to International Relations?
by
Stefan Rossbach
European University Institute 
Florence, Italy
(Prepared for delivery at the 1992 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, September 3-6, 1992.)
Introduction 1
1
I spent the fail and winter 1989 in Athens, Ohio, in order to study contemporary 
history at Ohio University. I was far away from Berlin, then, when the Berlin Wall was 
opened in early November. CNN reported "live", and I remember pictures showing 
numerous East-German cars -  Trabbis -  crossing what was as yet a border. I 
remember pictures showing young people dancing on the wall which only a few days 
ago separated them. I did not watch much of these pictures, though, and I did not feel 
like celebrating. Somehow I was concerned, and I still find it difficult to express about 
what. Not so much about new security orders in Europe or elsewhere, not about a too 
powerful Germany or the future of the Warsaw Pact. Instead, I was concerned about 
the tragedy behind the question of how it was possible that 45 years of deadly 
seriousness could be turned into lightness, easiness, even happiness over night. For 
if this was possible, then what was the meaning of all that seriousness, which I -- as 




























































































It is this confusion, this uneasiness, this doubt which bars my way to the easy 
answers: power comes and goes, superpower rivalries come and go, etc. Instead, the 
question must be: What is the meaning of the Cold War in a context of social 
evolution? Therefore: How does one conceptualize social evolution? And, on that 
basis: What was the Cold War? These should be the question-marks of this essay.1 
At first, this essay must face, then, the highly irrelevant and therefore lonely task of 
designing a general framework potentially capable of describing all aspects of social 
evolution. From the outset, the task is paradoxical: whatever this framework will look 
like, it will itself be a result of social evolution and thus, as a general framework, must 
incorporate itself. In other words, the claim to universality must make a theory -  
framework, concept — self-referential. The theory somehow must re-discover itself as 
one of the phenomena it was supposed to cover; it must re-enter the framework it 
constitutes. It must be circular. Clearly, in an intellectual environment which denies 
circular reasoning the quality of being "empirical", any attempt to pursue this project 
despite of its circularity must be seen sceptically and may even provoke hostility. And 
yet the alternative would be to artificially exclude aspects of the social world and then 
to study a phenomenon, e.g. the Cold War, from an artificially restricted perspective, 
which, in most cases, is not aware of its restrictions. The latter strategy has been 
predominant in the history of thought for the last centuries, perhaps because of its 
self-propelling effect: the restrictions of one perspective can be observed from another 
perspective which thereby produces other restrictions which, too, can be observed and 
so on. In a sense, a self-referential theory design will stand outside of this tradition — 
not because it can see everything (it cannot), but because it can theorize about its 
restrictions within itself. *
' This essay summarizes a longer paper — "The Autopoiesis of International Relations" - - 1 wrote for the 
European University Institute. It contains ideas in progress and should be seen as a starting point rather 





























































































But how can it be done? What does a theory look like which can theorize'about 
itself? A concept which conceptualizes itself? How does one design a recursive 
framework of social evolution? Not accidentally, what appears as a problem is at the 
same time its solution. If the theory generalizes its own problem -- how to unfold out 
of circularity, out of paradoxes -- and regards it as the constitutive problem of reality 
in general, then at least for the theory, the problem disappears. If the theory interprets 
what it is supposed to interpret as phenomena which evolve on the basis of a circle, 
and if it then theorizes about how this is possible, it will by implication theorize about 
itself. As the theory grows -- if it grows -- it provides ample evidence of the productive 
power of circularity, of tautologies, and paradoxes -- a theme which is central to this 
essay. A theory which follows these guidelines will interpret the world from a highly 
peculiar perspective. For a circle refers to everything and nothing. Circles imply 
arbitrariness: they do not dispose of preferred directions, and any of their points is as 
good or bad as anyone else. The theory’s task is then to describe or, if you will, to 
explain how self-referential systems nevertheless exist; how they can determine their 
immediate future despite of circular arbitrariness. If everything is possible, then the 
problem is to delineate how seif-referential systems do what they do and nothing else. 
The problem is to explain how in a world of principally infinite possibilities trains depart 
and arrive on time, newspapers are printed every day, laws are enacted, children 
educated, conferences held and students burdened with seminar papers. From this 
viewpoint, nothing can be taken as given. For a theory which consistently employs this 
perspective, existence is inherently paradoxical because whatever exists, exists 
despite of or because of the paralysing arbitrariness of its underlying self-reference.
4
All this amounts to a tremendous challenge, which, to my knowledge, only 
Niklas Luhmann has taken up. If there is a common problematic behind his writings, 




























































































essence.2 This essay, somewhat dogmatically, first introduces and then adopts 
Luhmanris perspective. It understands the social world as made up of self-referential, 
autopoietic social systems. Rather than to review the critical literature, to reflect upon 
and justify the assumptions behind this perspective, I prefer to outline some of them 
(part I) and then to build up on them until I arrive at a framework (part II) complex 
enough to reflect on the meaning of the Cold War and its end (part III). It is not only 
the peculiarity of Luhmann’s perspective, but also the peculiarity of the question this 
essay started with which prescribes that, at first, the Cold War disappears from the 
following pages until the essay has become complex enough to refer to it. Thus, this 
essay requires patient readers who can wait and read until all the apparently separate 
terms and pieces in this essay will finally (and hopefully) merge to a substantial whole 
-- to a theme -- at the end.
2 1 am not aware of an up-to-date bibliography of Luhmanris writings. A bibliography collected in 1987 
lists 264 entries. See Dirk Baecker, Jürgen Markowitz, Rudolf Stichweh, Hartmann Tyrell, Helmut Willke 




























































































Part I: Basic Assumptions of Autopoiesis
1
Autopoietic systems are systems which produce the preconditions of their own 
existence.3 And it is this very activity of production and reproduction from products 
which defines the system and its unity. In particular: the system produces its last 
components which are, at least for the system itself, undecomposable. These 
components are also called the system’s elements. As a consequence, everything 
which is used by the system as a unit is produced by the system itself: elements, 
processes, boundaries, structures, and last but not least the unity of the system itself. 
Thus, being a system is not a consequence of one general decision about the 
existence or non-existence of unity with specific characteristics, but instead an 
activity. The system chooses between continuation and end of reproduction of its 
elements via relational arrangements of those elements.
2
Autopoiesis is a Greek word and means "self-production".4 Yet "self-production" 
or "self-reproduction" is not the theme around which the theory of autopoiesis is
3 For a short and dense summary of what follows see Niklas Luhmann, The Autopoiesis of Social 
Systems, in Felix Geyer, Johannes van her Zouwen (eds.), Sociocybernetic Paradoxes: Observation, 
Control and Evolution of Self-Steering Systems. (London: Beverly Hills, 1986), pp.172-192. For an extensive 
treatment see Niklas Luhmann, Soziale Système: GrundriB einer allqemeinen Theorie. (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp, 4th ed. 1991).
4 The term was first used by Humberto R. Maturana and Francesco J. Varela as a title for their theory 
of the organization of life. See their Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living. (Dordrecht: 
Reidel, 1980). Fora summary see Humberto R. Maturana, Autopoiesis, in Milan Zeleny(ed.), Autopoiesis: 
A Theory ot Living Organization. (New York: North Holland, 1981), pp.21-30. For a critique of their concepts 
and the application of these concepts to the social sciences see e.g. Danilo Zolo, The Epistemological 
Status of the Theory of Autopoiesis and its Application to the Social Sciences, in A. Febbrajo, G. Teubner 
(eds.), State. Law, Economy as Autopoietic Systems: Regulation and Autonomy in a New Perspective. 
(Milano: Giuffrè, forthcoming). However, as even Zolo recognizes, a critique of Maturana and Varela cannot 
automatically be a critique of Luhmann, and this not only because the latter frequently points to differences 




























































































formed. In particular, the theory does not contain an hidden bias stating that systems 
always have an interest in self-preservation; a system may well maintain structures 
containing conditions of its own dissolution. Instead, it seems much more appropriate 
to mark "self-reference” as the central concept of the theory. For it is self-reference 
which defines or, more appropriate, which is the unity of a system. In a system, 
elements refer to themselves via other elements; the totality of those references and 
self-references represents a system. Any attempt to precisely delineate the relation 
between system and elements must inevitably experience the limits of a language 
which only allows for verbs that refer to (other) substantives. The relation between 
system and elements is not a "contained in" or a “whole-part" relation because, without 
the system -  without the "whole" --, the elements -- the "parts” -- would not exist. The 
system is involved in the very definition of the elements. The system produces the 
elements and provides the opportunity for them to exist and to operate for an amount 
of time determined by the system. The existence and activity of the elements, in turn, 
involves -- or consists of -- references to other elements and to themselves. These 
references, again, form the system. The system refers to itself via its elements; an 
element refers to itself via the system.
3
The most general term in which the intricacy of a system's existence can be put 
is the term "complexity". For the system, its environment is always more complex than 
itself so that it may have to build up defensive complexity in order to cope with the 
causal pressure it experiences from its environment. This slope of complexity between 
environment and system is the fundamental problem of systems theory. As the last 
reference point for functional analyses, it replaces old formulas such as conservano, 
persistence, or self-preservation.5 There are many different concepts of complexity,
5 See Niklas Luhmann, Komplexitât, in Luhmann. Sozioloqische Aüfklârunq 2, (Opladen: Westdeutscher 




























































































which I cannot review in this essay.6 They are all similar with regard to their 
consequences: complexity enforces selection. For a complete understanding of 
complexity usually requires an infinite amount of time or space. If a system responds 
to complexity, it can either do nothing -- which is then precisely the way it responds - 
- or it responds (only) to selected aspects of the complexity. Since this general 
principle holds for the operations of a system, it also applies to the observations of an 
observer (who is himself a system). Under conditions of complexity, the continuation 
of observations reflects selectivity.
4
The problem with complexity, however, is not just a problem of selection. One 
can always select "something"; the difficulty is, rather, not to lose everything eise 
different from what was selected. In ether words, the world should not. via selection, 
shrink down to the one and only possibility the system chooses as its next immediate 
state. For most systems, the problem lies in the fact that, on the one hand, they have 
to reduce complexity in order to determine their immediate future without, on the other 
hand, leading them into a dead end. In a sense, complexity must be reduced and 
preserved at the same time. The selection of the next focus of attention should not 
diminish the potentiality of the future -- unless, of course, the system wants to avoid 
future.
6 For discussion see e.g. Heinz R. Pagets third chapter in The Dreams ot Reason: The Computer and 
the Rise ot the Sciences of Complexity. (New York: Bantam Books, 1989), pp.54-70; George J. Klir, The 
Many Faces of Complexity, in The United Nations University (ed.).The Science and Practice ot Complexity. 
(Tokyo: The UN University, 1985), pp.81 -98: John A. Casti, Connectivity. Complexity, Catastrophe in Large- 
Scale Systems. (New York: John Wiley, 1979), especially pp.40-45, 97-125; John E. Savage. The 
Complexity of Computing, (New York: John Wiley, 1976), Martin D. Davies, Elaine J. Weynker, 





























































































As a common achievement of their co-evolution, psychic and social systems 
developed "meaning" as specific mode of representing complexity. Since those who 
ask for a definition of “meaning" implicitly confirm, by their very question, that they 
know what it is, I can restrict myself here to a brief description of what meaning does. 
Meaning supplies the actual state of the system with redundant possibilities of further 
experience and action so that actuality always appears as surrounded by possibilities. 
On the screen of the system, any focus of attention appears as one among many. 
Thus meaning links the actual and the possible via a set of references and thereby 
guarantees that those possibilities which were not selected are not totally eliminated. 
This activity involves self-reference also because the set of possibilities an actuality 
refers to always contains the possibility of its re-actualization (which therefore can be 
negated). The function of meaning is to identify all operations of a system as 
selections and, at the same time, to preserve the world from shrinking down to just 
one particular state.7 Or, in still other words, meaning mediates between an actuality 
which is certain but unstable, and between a potentiality which is uncertain but 
stable.8
6
Meaning always refers to meaning. A possibility becomes actuality only if it 
refers to further possibilities; nothing has meaning in itself. The totality of all those 
references is referred to as "world". The world is closed in the sense that meaning- 
based autopoiesis always presupposes meaning; any attempt by the system to leave 
its meaning world only expands this world. We cannot leave the meaningful world in
7 One may say that, via meaning, psychic and social systems represent complexity as “tractai". On the 
concept of “fractals" see Benoit B. Mandelbrot, The Fractal Geometry of Nature. (San Francisco: Freeman, 
1983), and Fleinz-Otto Peitgen, Peter H. Richter. The Beauty of Fractals. (Berlin: Springer, 1986).
8 On "meaning" see Luhmann, Soziale Système, op.cit., pp.92-147, and Niklas Luhmann, Meaning as 
Basic Concept, in Essays on Self-Reference. (New York: Columbia University Press), pp.21-79, and 




























































































a meaningful way (Luhmann). The world is open in the sense that the referring from 
meaning to meaning never comes to an end (as long as the system exists). In fact, 
due to its circularity, meaning continuously constitutes the infinite openness of the 
world -- the ultimate horizon of accessible possibilities. Systems which process self­
reference and complexity by means of meaning do not dispose of any other instrument 
that could fulfil the same purpose. For those systems, everything is given as meaning. 
Their environments are -  or, if you will, have -- meaning, the systems’ boundaries are 
meaning boundaries, and their elements and structures, too, are part of the systems’ 
meaning worlds. As a consequence, the system becomes able to relate all these 
entities.
7
In short: psychic and social systems build up an internal model -- the world -  
of what is important for those systems. This internal representation may be highly 
dynamic: the world moves as the system’s operations move and thus remains 
inaccessible -  infinite -- in its totality. The theory of autopoiesis presupposes a strict 
differentiation of living, psychic and social systems and, on the other hand, identifies 
autopoiesis as their common characteristic. In this scheme, their meaning-based 
operation is what differentiates psychic and social systems from living (organic) 
systems.8 9 *For the investigation of social and psychic systems, meaning implies the 
inadequacy of concepts of evolution which are primarily based on the idea of "external 
selection" and adaption. Meaning-based systems evolve according to a specific 
internal criteria: compatibility with their meaning world.'0 In fact, the self-referentially 
closed meaning-based operation of those systems implies that their environments do
8 On the evolution ot this differentiation see Erhard Oeser, Psychozoikum: Evolution und Mechanismus 
der menschlichen Erkenntnistahiqkeit. (Berlin, Hamburg: Paul Parey, 1987), and also Gerhard Roth, Die
Entwicklung kognitiver Selbstreferentialitât im menschlichen Gehim, in Dirk Baecker, Jurgen Markowitz, 
Rudolt Stichweh, Hartmann Tyrell, Helmut Willke (eds.), Theorie als Passion, op.cit., pp.394-422.
They share, then, certain characteristics with what Heinz von Foerstercalls "non-trivial machines". See 
Heinz von Foerster, Principles of Self-Organization -  In a Socio-Managerial Context, in Hans Ulrich, Gilbert 




























































































not have direct causal access to the systems without the systems’ concurrence. It may 
be helpful to illustrate this relation between system and environment with a metaphor. 
Imagine someone dreaming that he prepares a dinner for his girlfriend and himself at 
a lovely summer evening. He sees himself cooking, laying the table, lighting the 
candles, and then, eventually, his alarm clock rings. But, instead of waking him up, the 
noise is incorporated into the dream’s meaning world as the longed for doorbell: his 
loved one has arrived and the dinner can begin (and the dream can continue).11 In 
particular: the noise will be noticed only if the dream is able to assign meaning to it. 
Thus, for meaning-based systems, openness is a result of the system’s activity; it is, 
if you will, an achievement -  which nevertheless may have disastrous consequences 
for the system. Psychic and social systems reproduce themselves by submitting 
themselves to this self-reproduced selectivity. Being a system is, among other things, 
this self-referentially closed reproduction of openness. And closure at the level of the 
system’s self-referential operation is a precondition of openness. The environment can 
only provide the noise which the system may (or may not) take as disturbances or 
irritations around which order is being built. Thus the environment may offer impulses 
but is not able to determine their effects on the system.
8
Psychic and social systems are distinguished according to whether they use 
consciousness or communication as modes of meaning-based reproduction. 
Meaning can fit into a sequence of references which is based on and oriented towards 
sensation and which surfaces as consciousness; meaning can also fit into a sequence 
of references which process a distinction between information and utterance and which 
"understand" this distinction made in earlier references.* 12 In the latter case, the
This Is the way Gunther Teubner illustrated system-environment relations in his seminar "Autopoiesis 
in Law and Politics" (Fall 1991) at the EUI.
12 On communication see Niklas Luhmann, Soziale Système, op.cit., pp.191-241; Luhmann, Die 
Unwahrscheinlichkeit der Kommunikation, in Luhmann, Sozioloqische Aufklârunq 3. (Opladen: 




























































































sequence of references surfaces as communication. The choice between the two 
modes of operation is not to be made at single events. Rather, due to the self- 
referential constitution of meaning, consciousness will always refer to consciousness 
and communication to communication. Any consciousness which tries to understand 
the sharp distinction between these kinds of operation faces the problem that it cannot 
operate beyond consciousness: it can only understand communication as 
communication consciously pursued by consciousness in order to make further 
consciousness possible. However, communication is possible only as an event that 
occurs beyond the closure of consciousness. As such, it must be, in some sense, 
autonomous.
9
Two (or more) autopoietic systems can co-evolve via structural coupling. The 
term always refers to a relation between systems with each of them belonging to the 
other's environment. Structural coupling means that a system makes its own 
complexity available for the constitution of another system and vice versa. For 
example, a system is constituted by using other systems as undecomposable 
elements; and for these elements, in turn, the participation in this constitution is a 
precondition of their existence as systems.13 Structural coupling is not a causal 
relationship in that causal schemes presuppose a difference in time. Co-evolution, 
however, always means simultaneous evolution. Systems which are coupled in this 
way do not simply produce similar things. Rather the structural coupling is essentially 
involved in the very constitution of the participating systems. Even if structurally
13 The Nitrogen cycle -- or any other ecosystemic cycle -- may serve here as an example of structural 
coupling. In the Nitrogen cycle, plants take up nitrate from the soil and convert it into amino acids and 
nucleotides, then to proteins and nucleic acids. Decomposers hydrolyze these polymers, then deaminate 
the monomers, releasing ammonia. The latter serves as an energy source for Nitrosomas bacteria which 
oxidize it to nitrite, which is in tum oxidized by Nitrobacter to nitrate, closing the ecosystemic cycle. Note 
that while each of these microbes is in business for itself -- exploiting energy sources for survival and 
reproduction - ,  it is the ecosystemic cycle to which they all contribute that makes their niches ot existence 
possible. The cycle would not exist without the complexities of the plants and bacteria; in tum, none of the 
latter autopoietic systems could exist without the complexity of the entire cycle. See Jeffrey S. Wicken, 




























































































coupled systems use the same elements, those common elements -- although 
identical as events -- still have different meanings, different histories, and different 
futures in different systems.
10
Structural coupling is also the condition of the co-evolution of psychic and social 
systems. Psychic systems presuppose social systems in their environment and vice 
versa. In particular, psychic systems do not appear within social systems but within 
their environments. Ironically, it is precisely this "exclusion" of the psychic which shows 
that autopoiesis takes the individual seriously -- perhaps more so than other 
approaches. For the environment is for a system always the part of the world with the 
greater complexity. In fact, to conceptualize psychic systems as parts of the 
environments of social systems is to acknowledge the former’s complexity.14 From 
the perspective of a social system, the complexity of a psychic system always appears 
as contingency.15 Structurally coupled psychic and social systems realize within 
themselves the others’ differences between system and environment without being 
divided in the same way. The consciousness of a psychic system produces and 
contains descriptions of the boundaries of the social systems it is coupled with. Yet, 
precisely because these boundaries are not its own boundaries, the psychic system 
is able to ignore them and thereby to change the social systems’ boundaries. 
Communication, in turn, must always take into account in how far it binds and 
fascinates psychic systems. Thus the boundaries of psychic systems are also 
represented in the domain of communication. Language usually guarantees sufficient 1
11 For the theory design as presented here, consciousness is not less but indeed more involved in 
communication -- but not as a cause-setting subject. Those who really wanted to understand worid politics 
in terms of what psychic systems say and do would somehow have to specify which of the currently 5 billion 
psychic systems have more competence than others -  and this because of those system’s own capabilities 
and not because of positions which the communicative system society assigns to them. On the distinction 
and relation between consciousness and communication see also Luhmann, Die Wissenschaft der 
Gesellschaft. (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1990), pp.26,38,41,51,282.
,s See Niklas Luhmann, Interpenetration — Zum Verhaltnis personaler und sozialer Systeme, in 




























































































fascination of psychic systems; it automatizes the structural coupling between psychic 
and social systems.
11
It is important to remember that meaning-based systems observe what they 
observe through their meaning-worlds. This gives systems the opportunity to 
asymmetrize their self-reference by representing circularity, symmetry and infinity as 
linearity, asymmetry and finiteness respectively -- by making mistakes, if you will. 
Quasi as artificially straightened lines, the system may introduce asymmetries into its 
meaning world and thereby -  perhaps unwillingly or imperfectly -  give direction to its 
autopoiesis. It may identify goals and purposes in its meaning world and in this way 
get out of the paralysing tautology of its self-reference just as Munchhausen pulled 
himself out of a swamp by his own hairs. Most important, the system may arrive at a 
self-description, i.e. it may integrate itself into its meaning world and thus establish 
a notion of a self. It may then find guidance for further autopoiesis precisely in this 
self-produced self-description and evolve in accordance with what it believes it is. Self­
descriptions open all kinds of new evolutionary pathways. A system may find 
orientation in its self-description. It may obtain greater coherence and thus become 
able to undergo sudden and total changes. It may even externalize its unity, take it as 
a given and, on that assumption, build up more and more internal complexity. It may 
problematize its own being or regard itself as contingent. For a self-observing system, 
it finally becomes possible to assign meaning to what it regards as its history, and so 
on. There is no necessity behind those developments even if the system observes 
itself. It should be clear, though, t.iat, once the system enters its meaning world, the 
system’s complexity may eventually increase sharply. However, this is not to say that 
self-descriptions are always desirable achievements. Asymmetries only occur in the 
system’s meaning world. As such, they are, however camouflaged, results of self- 




























































































depending on whether a system asymmetrizes its self-reference by assigning causality 
to its environment or to itself respectively.'6
12
As part of its self-steering, communication often employs binary codes in order 
to discriminate previous communication. Binary codes are qualitative, asymmetric 
schemes which structure communication depending on previous communication. For 
example, a communication can be true or false, legal or illegal, and even good or bad 
-- and communication continues accordingly! Binary codes need not be binary in the 
sense that the negation of one value automatically generates the other and vice versa. 
A binary code may offer a continuous line of evaluations but it will always be a line, 
i.e. one-dimensional with only two directions of evaluations. Binary codes exclude third 
possibilities. Their functioning requires that access to the unity behind the dichotomy 
they establish is strictly limited to certain exceptional situations.'7 Codes are 
asymmetric in the sense that one of their two sides -  e.g. “true" -- guarantees that 
communication can simply follow up whereas the other side -- “false" -- forces 
communication to reflect upon where else it may find the “right" place to link up. It is, 
then, only on the “negative" side of the code where the code re-enters again and 
again until something is discriminated as “positive" and allows, if you will, "business 
as usual”.,e
13
Binary codes are arbitrary: everything could be "true" or "false", "legal" or 
"illegal", “good" and "bad”. They may have, then, a catalytic function: something must *17
See Niklas Luhmann, Erleben und Handeln, in Luhmann, Sozioloqische Aufklârunq 3. op.cit., pp.67-
80.
17 See Niklas Luhmann, Selbstreferenz und Teleologie in gesellsçhaftstheoretischer Perspektive, in 
Luhmann, Gesellschaftsstmktur und Semantik 2. (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1981), pp.9-44.




























































































be done in order to remove the arbitrariness! The code’s arbitrariness is aimed at its 
removal and thus provokes more and more communication about whether other 
communication is "true", “ legal" or “good1'. Once the communication using the code 
has become sufficiently complex, it may eventually exist on its own and independent 
from the original context of its emergence. In this way, codes promote the 
differentiation of social systems. For example, the social system science is made up 
precisely of those communications which employ the code true/false; the law system 
of those employing the code legal/illegal, and so on.19 The function of the emerging 
systems is to distribute, manage and discharge the codes' arbitrariness. Thus, 
functional differentiation goes hand in hand with semantic differentiation. Note that this 
does not lead to an hierarchy of systems with one operating in another like Russian 
dolls. The fully differentiated “subsystems" will regard the communicative context within 
which they emerged as part of their environments. Functional differentiation is more 
(or something else) than merely an internal partition of systems! Furthermore, once 
the system or "subsystem" established itself in correspondence with a code, it profits 
from the code’s indifference. For the code itself does not determine what is positive 
or negative. It requires programs to specify how to use the code. Yet, these programs 
-  theories, beliefs -- fail on their own, independently of the code. And the greater the 
fluctuation and demise of the programs, the more stable the code will appear against 
this background of catastrophes. In the extreme, the code will be taken as a given so 
that the corresponding subsystem’s existence is secure whatever it produces. For 
example, scientific progress produces problems whose solutions require more scientific 
progress; and the identification of both problems and solutions is again a scientific 
venture.
,s See Niklas Luhmann, Die Wissenschatt der Gesellschatt, op.cit, Luhmann, Die Wirtschaft der 
Gesellschaft, (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhikamp, 1988), and Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschatt. (Frankfurt a.M.: 




























































































Part II: Undecidability and the Dynamics of Truthfulness
1
In the following, the term (world) society denotes the totality of all 
communication. The term as such is purely technical, but it allows me to ask an 
interesting question: Is society a social system? In fact, I do not intend to answer this 
question, but merely to study the consequences of attempts to answer it. For the 
question is tricky. For any other set of communications, it is in principle possible to 
denote the set as a social system from outside the set. In other words, one may 
identify these sets as social systems even though they do not describe themselves as 
social systems. Self-observation and self-description, i.e. the integration of the 
system’s unity in its meaning world is not a necessary requirement of social 
autopoiesis. Society, however, is peculiar: any claim that society forms a social system 
is part of society. As the totality of all communication, society includes all 
communication about society. Hence, society can exist as a social system only on 
the basis of self-observation and self-description. Society can only inaugurate itself 
as a system by determining what it is, by assigning meaning to itself.
2
But how can society identify itself? Does society have an intrinsic ability to 
establish truth about itself? In other words, is it possible for society to arrive at a self­
description which captures society’s existence in terms of truth? Can it, in this way, 
ever be sure of its identity? Or, in still other words, does society have an intrinsic 
ability to compare and assess some kind of "appropriateness" of the different self­
descriptions in a logically closed way which cannot be doubted? Clearly, if such an 
ability existed, society’s efforts could be guided by hopes (or fears) of approximation. 
There would be, then, an intrinsically preferred direction, a teleology, behind the 




























































































Behind all these questions is -- somewhat hidden but, I hope, still recognizable -- the 
question of the possibility of normativity.
3
At the level of theory, these questions are first of all questions of logic -- and 
not of morality. In fact, the previous questions bear a structural correspondence to 
what logicians call the "Halting problem for Turing machines". I will now briefly explain 
what this problem consists of. A Turing machine is a formal model of the process of 
computation or, in other words, of sequences of deterministic cause-effect 
relationships.20 In particular, although it is often taken as the archetype of modern 
computers, a Turing machine is not a machine; it is a conceptualization of, if you will, 
a particular way of thinking or of processing information via sequences of cause-effect 
links. The Halting problem occurs in the context of prediction; Is there a general and 
effective decision procedure based on deterministic cause-effect relations which can 
decide, for any given Turing machine, whether this machine stops its operations at 
some point or whether it enters an infinite loop? The problem is, then, whether there 
is a general method which predicts fundamental aspects of the final qualitative 
behaviours of Turing machines, i.e. whether there is a method to establish truth about 
future operations of all Turing machines. If, however, all deterministic procedures can 
be modelled as a Turing machine, the same question can be put in a much shorter 
way, which also reveals its self-reference: Is there a Turing machine which can predict 
the final behaviours of all Turing machines?
20 See Alan M. Turing, On Computable Numbers with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem. 
Proceedings o f the London Mathematical Society, Series 2, Vol.42 (1936-37). pp.230-267, (a correction, 
ibid., Vol.43 (1937), pp.544-546). A useful collection of the original papers of Kurt Gddel. Alonzo Church. 
Stephen C. Kleene, Emil Post, and Alan M. Turing on undecidable propositions is Martin D. Davis. The 
Undecidable. (New York: Raven Press, 1965). See also Hartley Rogers Jr., Theory of Recursive Functions 





























































































In the same paper in which he introduced his "machines", Alan M. Turing 
provided the correct negative answer to the problem. He was able to rigorously prove 
that, for logical reasons, a Turing machine which would decide whether or not any 
given Turing machine would ever halt cannot exist. This fact is usually referred to as 
the undecidability of the Halting problem. The proof is elegant, subtle and too 
formal to be included in this paper.21 Before I begin to translate this result into a 
social context, I will again try to clarify its meaning. If a certain class of problems is 
undecidable, this does not mean that all problems in this class are unsolvable. In fact, 
in many cases it is not very difficult to decide whether or not a certain Turing machine 
will halt. The point is rather that, in general, the answer for one machine is logically 
independent of the answer for another machine. In general, it is impossible to derive 
one answer from another. Undecidability implies that a logic which provides answers 
to some of the problems cannot be generalized to a solution for the entire class of 
problems under examination. Thus, undecidable questions are those which concern 
phenomena which, for reasons of logic, do not allow generalization. Undecidability is, 
if you will, the most fundamental justification of heuristics or, in other words, rules of 
thumb.22 Thus, undecidability becomes acute as a problem only if one looks for more 
or something else -- e.g. for intrinsic, final procedures which are still logically honest. 
In particular: it is always possible to decide the undecidable. Undecidability only 
implies that a decision cannot be logically derived from the undecidable and thus must 
be based on criteria external to the undecidable phenomena.
5
Undecidability is the reason why it is not possible for communication to logically 
derive truth about the totality of all communications from single communications.
21 For a quite readable account of Turings proof see Roger Penrose, The Emperors New Mind. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp.30-73.
22 See John von Neumann, Zur Hilbertschen Beweistheorie, in A.H. Taub (ed.), John von Neumann: 





























































































Society does not have an intrinsic access to an identity by means of calculations of 
truth. For logical reasons, communication employing the binary code true/false is not 
able to cover the totality of all communication and is thus not able to identify eventual 
common aspects of those communications. As a corollary, we observe that a theory 
of society either does not exist or must start from this observation. Again: due to 
society’s strict closure at the level of its operation -- communication there is no 
intrinsic basis within society upon which truth about this society could be 
established.23 This result also touches the question of whether society forms a social 
system -- the answer is neither No nor Yes. Society is fundamentally unknown to 
itself. The only moment where self-knowledge could, in principle, capture society’s 
identity is the moment of its dissolution.24
6
I anticipate some scepticism with regard to the transfer of the notion of 
undecidability from Turing machines to social systems. A great amount of literature 
has been produced which critically discusses the scope of Turing’s result.25 In a 
sense, this discussion is beside the point. It is important to see that undecidability 
does not occur independently of a specific question and an expectation as to how it 
is to be answered. Thus, nothing is in itself undecidable. Undecidability means, again, 
that a question -  which must be asked -- cannot be answered in a certain way -- 
which must be chosen. Society can encounter undecidability only if it problematizes
23 On logical paradoxes in the context of self-organizing systems see also Klaus Komwachs, Walter von 
Lucadou, Komplexe Systeme, in Klaus Kornwachs (ed.), Otlenheit - Zeitlichkeit - Komplexitat: ZurTheorie 
der Offenen Systeme. (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 1984), pp.110-165.
24 Due to the self-referential closure of consciousness, similar results also hold for a psychic system 
trying to establish truth about itself. Compare this view, then, to common beliefs claiming that shortly before 
one's death or in the moment of death, one sees his entire life as a kind of quick-motion picture -- indicating 
that, at last, a psychic system is able in this moment to obtain complete self-knowledge.
25 For an overview of common interpretations see Douglas R. Hofstadter, Godel, Escher, Bach: An 
Eternal Golden Braid, (London: Penguin Books, 1980), pp.561 -575. For a short discussion of some of their 
philosophical ramifications see Robert Rosen, Effective Processes and Natural Law, in Rolf Herken (ed ), 





























































































its identity, its entirety in terms of truth. The justification for the use of the concept of 
undecidability lies, then, in the questions it answers -- not in society or in the social 
systems. Therefore, undecidability must be treated as an emergent social 
phenomenon. Society produces undecidability simultaneously with the questions and 
expectations it raises about itself. Accordingly, the function of undecidability must be 
seen in correspondence with the questions producing it. Whereas an however 
proclaimed societal identity may structure and guide the autopoiesis of all social 
systems within society for some time, the undecidability of any societal identity 
prevents society from producing its own end in form of a predictable recurrent 
procedure or static situation. For if things were decidable, why should there be a need 
for social autopoiesis, for psychic autopoiesis, for evolution, for change, for continuity? 
Society was not set up, it seems, in order to produce a consensus. It is, in contrast, 
precisely the undecidability and hence unpredictability of the series of society’s self­
descriptions which provides an incentive for its further existence. The infinite task of 
self-identification is autocatalytic and therefore useful: for society, the only possible 
answer to the question of what society should be is ... to be society!
7
If society commits itself -- for whatever (emergent) reasons — to the idea of a 
truthful self-description providing an identity which remains valid over time, the search 
for this truth about the self introduces a specific dynamics to the evolution of society - 
- the dynamics of truthfulness. For a society which begins to create truth about itself 
in the expectation that there is such a time-less truth, undecidability becomes the 
universal, undirected background dynamics behind its evolution. Undecidability is what 
makes the search for truth about the self autocatalytic: the discovery that the self is 
unknown to itself only makes further self-observation necessary. As a permanent 
provocation, a potential for change is from then on built into the logic of the system. 




























































































intransigence of freedom at the heart of the power relationship" (Foucault)26 -  for, 
under conditions of undecidability, the imposition of meaning at no point becomes a 
closed affair. The imposition of a societal truth becomes a question of evolutionary 
success in a competition for truth -- and not a question of logical consistency.
8
Once society embarks on the dynamics of truthfulness, its evolution will more 
or less follow the principles of morphogenesis and, as a consequence, can be 
described as an alternation of attractors and bifurcations.27 If, for some reason, 
society manages to remain loyal to a specific self-description or to a certain aspect of 
its self-descriptions, I shall refer to this description or aspect as an "attractor".28 For 
a seif-description to become an attractor, it is not sufficient that communication is 
attracted to it. Due to the co-evolution of society and all (!) psychic systems, a self­
description of society must also somehow convince or attract the autopoietic 
reproduction of psychic systems. In other words, it must shape a subjectivity which will 
then foster its own validity. Whenever an attractor loses its appeal for the truthful 
society, it must be replaced by another. For many reasons, the removal of one and 
insertion of another self-description will require time. During the in-between periods, 
society is in a precarious situation. It must somehow select its identity and yet, as 
there is no guiding self-description, it may have no control over what is being selected. 
Moreover, since society in these moments expects its new identity as a truth which it 
only must reveal rather than produce, it may condemn itself to inactivity. It must wait
26 The quote is taken from Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, in Hubert L. Dreyfus, Paul Rabinow, 
Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, (Chicago: The Chicago University Press, 1983),
pp.208-226.
27 The standard reference on morphogenesis is René Thom, Structural Stability and Morphogenesis. 
(Reading, MA: Benjamin, 1975).
28 The term is taken from dynamical systems theory. For details seee.g. J.M.T. Thompson, H.B. Stewart, 
Nonlinear Dynamics and Chaos. (New York: John Wiley, 1987), Rudiger Seydel, From Equilibrium to Chaos. 
(New York: Elsevier, 1988), Robert L. Devanev. An Introduction to Chaotic Dynamical Systems, (Redwood 
City, CA: Addison-Wesley, 2nd ed. 1989), Neil Rasband, Chaotic Dynamics ot Nonlinear Systems. (New 




























































































until it is able to invent a self-description which describes itself as a necessity. The 
strangeness of this procedure cannot last for too long. Society and the social systems 
within it will become oversensitive to irritations from within and outside, especially to 
the noise generated by psychic systems -- after all, everything may be an indicator of 
the societal truth. And if all this lasts for too long and if the continuing uncertainty 
threatens to question the entire manoeuvre, society may eventually generate self­
descriptions which claim that currently no self-description or a multiplicity of those 
exists. Nevertheless, in its search for truth, society may produce more coherence than 
by actually using a self-description. These inherently unstable situations I call 
"bifurcations”.29 It is the logic of bifurcations, if you will, that society has no control 
over its future despite of all efforts. In fact, the more society exerts itself for truth, and 
the more carefully it observes what it thinks is going on, the more critically dependent 
it becomes upon minor differences. Due to this procedure, the new self-description can 
be of almost infinite unlikelihood. And in a strike of ingenuity, society may find 
reassurance precisely in its improbability. If the chance of a monkey typing 
Shakespeare’s “Hamlet'1 on a typewriter by accident is smaller than one divided by a 
number greater than the number of particles in the universe,30 then there must be 
something to social evolution!
9
The search for a true identity is a delicate business. It can all too easily lead 
to disappointments, i.e. to revelations of aspects of the self, which -  however 
unnecessarily -  appear on the society’s screen as defects. Any kind of change bears 
the danger of disappointments: something that was labelled as truth may turn out as 
false. However, this need not cause problems. Society can find reassurance in the
29 On bifurcations see also Grégoire Nicolis, Ilya Prigogine, Exploring Complexity. (New York: Freeman, 
1989), pp.71-75,164-171; and Ilya Prigogine, Science, Civilization and Democracy, in Futures, Voi. 18, No.4 
(August 1986), pp.493-507.
30 This calculation is made up in William Poundstone, The Recursive Universe: Cosmic Complexity and 




























































































discovery of mistakes. The discovery is still a discovery and as such suggests 
progress! After all, one can be truthful in the observation of falseness. However, when 
a truthful society arrives at a new self-description, it must somehow convince itself that 
the new truth, as truth, must have been there all the time -  even before it was 
produced and then revealed. A society (or a social system) which observes itself in 
terms of truth needs a meaningful history! It needs a history which connects current 
with (all!) earlier self-descriptions. It needs causality. And in accordance with this need, 
society will in advance direct communications on routes which it regards as compatible 
with what it perceives as its history. Society will see itself as forced to “learn" from its 
history. And learning from history is possible only if history is not seen as contingent 
but as necessary, as a given to which society must adapt. If, in this way, history is to 
be a pool of causality, society will have to accept it as an expression of the external 
truth it is looking for.
10
One may ask: Can the search for truth go on forever once it started? Is it 
possible to delineate different stages it will go through? What are the likely results of 
the dynamics of truthfulness? I will start my brief speculations by introducing what 
systems theorists call the role of progression towards the most resistant form .31 
Imagine, for a moment, that the storage cells of a computer are filled randomly with 
digits between one and nine. Imagine further that a dynamic law is introduced whereby 
pairs of neighbouring digits are multiplied together and then replaced by the final digits 
of their various products. What will be the result of this process? Although 
microscopically random, the evolution is macroscopically predictable: eventually the 
process will generate a zero in one of the cells. And further multiplications with 
neighbouring cells will generate even more zeros until indeed all cells are filled with 
zeros. This example illustrates a phenomenon of extreme generality. Under a fixed 
determinate law, a process will automatically select those operands which are
31 For the following see W.R. Ashby, Principles of the Self-Organizing System, in H. von Foerster, G. 




























































































specially resistant to the change-making tendency. After all, the zeros are uniquely 
resistant to change by multiplication. This general rule of progression towards the most 
resistant form is not as surprising as it may seem. For whatever lasting pattern a 
process produces -- even if only temporarily -- it must be resistant to the underlying 
dynamics to some degree since it would otherwise undergo further changes and would 
not become observable in the first place. Now I can rephrase the questions posed at 
the beginning of this section as follows: what would be the most resistant form society 
can arrive at under the dynamics of truthfulness?
11
Under conditions of undecidability, it seems likely that a truthful society will have 
to generalize the truth of its history from more and more successive self-descriptions. 
As society evolves, it may have to extract a general truth out of an increasingly diverse 
history. Under those circumstances, the most resistant form which can evolve is a 
truth which claims the impossibility of truth. The law of history is that there are no 
laws! It finally becomes decidable that things are undecidable. Further disappointments 
can easily be interpreted as additional evidence for this most abstract truth that can 
be invented. All this is not as paradoxical as it may seem. As history, undecidability 
becomes a topic for communication not as an emergent phenomenon created in a 
search for truth, but as truth itself, as a given, as something on must accept, one must 
adapt to. As a consequence, the discovery of undecidability at the level of history does 
not as yet seriously interrupt the dynamics of truthfulness. Society can begin to build 
up order precisely around the certainty of uncertainty. Society’s self-descriptions will 
begin to focus on, say, the impossibility of normative thinking, cultural pluralism, self- 
determination (!), diversity, democracy, etc. Moreover, in a truthful society which 
excludes the possibility of a truthful self-description, every actually emerging self­
description must be seen as a potential danger. Society will define and create its 
problems and threats accordingly, will respond to them and find reassurance in 
mastering them. The resistance of this self-renouncing truth against the dynamics of 




























































































disappearance of other truth claims in form of distinct self-descriptions only confirms 
the truth.
12
At first, the law of the absence of laws is a truth just like any other truth. It 
introduces a difference into society between truthful and untruthful communications 
and sorts out the latter as defective. In particular, there is little reason to assume that 
the imposition of this form of truth requires less violence than other forms. And yet, the 
self-renouncing truth is peculiar. If society arrives at a point where it cultivates 
undecidability as truth, it puts itself in a delicate tension. On the one hand, the truth 
of undecidability is as undecidable as any other self-description of society and thus 
remains vulnerable. It cannot justify itself in a logically closed way -  in fact, this is the 
condition of its possibility! Yet on the other hand, the externaiization of undecidability 
as truth can only be the final attempt to elude the awareness that any societal truth 
is self-imposed. In other words, there does not seem to be a fiction beyond the fiction 
of truth. Any challenge to this last resort of societal truth is therefore existential in the 
most fundamental sense. The dilemma is, then, that the persistence of a self- 
renouncing truth depends on conditions which also expose it to dangers to which it is 
likely to respond in dramatic ways. Depending on the extent to which social (and 
psychic) autopoiesis operates in terms of truth, society might even prefer to annihilate 
itself with nuclear weapons rather than give up its truthfulness. And this theme may 
finally lead over also to an interpretation of most recent events -  the Cold War, its 




























































































Part III: The Autopoiesis of the Cold War
1
Society in search for truth about itself, hoping that a final, ultimate societal truth 
could provide guidance and somehow ease the burden of the closure of its 
fundamental self-reference, is finally guided -  perhaps without being aware of it -- 
precisely by this search and this hope. In light of these expectations, the likely 
encounter of undecidability must lead to disappointments which only intensify efforts 
to arrive at truthfulness: if a societal self-description turned out to be wrong, society 
must be more careful, more attentive, more observant in the next attempt. And yet the 
shifts may also be abrupt, as if the last failure only revealed what the new truth must 
be. This, in a nutshell, is the picture of social evolution I depicted on the previous 
pages. The dynamics of truthfulness, I explained, has its own logic and consequences; 
it defines its most resistant form and is likely to generate it. The Cold War and its end 
may provide evidence of this dynamics -  I will come back to this -- but there is 
another question I should ask first: How was this dynamics introduced?
2
This is a very deep question. It is, if you will, the question about the origins of 
social evolution. It is, no doubt, much too big for this paper; only a few authors ever 
arrived at a systematic treatment of this question.32 So I will leave it here as the big 
question-mark and take it as a strength of the previously introduced framework that 
it is indeed able to pose the question. All I want to do now is to indicate how early 
notions of the "state" reflected the (already ongoing) dynamics of a truthful society.
32 Friedrich Nietzsche is one of them; in fact, this was his theme. But he needed quite a long time before 





























































































In 15th century Europe, the state, like Latin status, at first denoted nothing but 
a stock-taking of the actual condition and present situation.33 The concepts that 
evolved in the 16th and 17th century around the raison d'état referred to a form of 
government which was reflexive in that it emphasized government in accordance with 
the “state", i.e. with what was to be governed.34 Constitutive for the art of government 
was therefore also the accumulation and use of knowledge of the "state". In this 
sense, the "art" of government became a "science" -- nicely illustrated by the 
Polizeiwissenschaft which emerged on German territories after the Thirty Years War. 
In an attempt to impose the known upon the unknown, the developing art of 
government centred around the economy, i.e. the correct way of managing individuals, 
goods and wealth within the family. The question at stake was how to introduce the 
meticulous attention of the father towards his family into the political practice of 
managing the "state". But this also meant that the finality of government resided in the 
things it managed; and these "things” were not just territory and inhabitants but in fact 
men in their relations, their links, their wealth, resources, means of subsistence; and 
the territory with its specific qualities like, climate, irrigation, fertility. These "things" 
were also customs, habits, ways of acting, thinking; accidents and misfortunes such 
as famine, epidemics, death etc.35 Government meant to engage in the handling of 
a new social complexity. It brought about administrative and governmental 
apparatuses, the science of the state -  "statistics" -- and soon found in the idea of the 
"population" the new centre of the economy. "Population", so the idea, now had its 
own truth irreducible to the dimension of the family.
33 See Niklas Luhmann, The "State" of the Political System, in Luhmann, Essays on Sell-Relerence, 
op.cit., pp.165-174.
3" For this discussion see also Colin Gordon, Governmental Rationality: An Introduction, in Graham 
Burchell, Colin Gordon, Peter Miller (eds.), The Foucault Effect -  Studies in Govemmentalitv, (Chicago, IL: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp.1-52.





























































































The attitude behind the "art" of government and the rise of the institutional state 
-- which first arose, then, in the form of absolutism -- can be interpreted as a response 
to the persistent confusion and suffering caused by religious and civil wars in Europe 
in the 16th century. One may say: in order to connect to the situation, the new attitude 
had to be based on the dynamics behind it -- the concern for truth; and in order to 
change the situation, the new attitude shifted the focus of this concern from external 
to internal references. In other words, the internally produced references to an external 
god were replaced by more or less open self-references; society tried to find 
orientation within itself. The emergence of Neostoicism reflected and nurtured the new 
intensity and dynamism founded strictly on reason.36 The raison d'état, in other 
words, manifested the "detheologization" of politics -  not to be mistaken, of course, 
for a general move towards irréligion. No longer part of and subordinate to the divine, 
cosmo-theological order of the world, government now had its own rationality. All this, 
however, established a need for self-observation -  at the level of society as well as 
of single psychic systems. The semantic place for these self-descriptions of societies 
was the "state", which was to be governed according to rational principles which were 
seen as intrinsic to it. Government was still government according to truth, but the 
truth was to be found within society, i.e. within its self-descriptions, and could not be 
derived solely from divine laws. In a sense, government became a reflection on human 
(social) nature.37 One may contemplate on whether and why the new art of 
government remained somewhat immobilized until perhaps the 18th century. However, 
what is important for the context of this paper is that, also at the level of society, a 
need for self-observation in terms of truth was part of the initial conditions of a growing 
concern about "international relations".38
36 Important: Gertiard Oestreich, Neostoicism and the Early Modem State, (ed. by Brigitta Oestreich, 
H.G. Koenigsberger, transl. by David McLintock), (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
37 Interesting in this context also Albert O. Hirschmann, The Passions and the Interests. (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1977).
38 The end ot the Thirty Years War with the Treaty ot Westphalia is commonly regarded as the birth of 
the first modem 'international system'. At the time, the new map of Europe was considered as drawn for 





























































































The concern with government and statecraft evolved simultaneously as a 
consequence and cause of an emerging interest in the “truth" of human behaviour. A 
concern with truth which exceeded merely utilitarian use was built into the notion of 
government -  at least in Western cultures, I should add -- from the beginning. The 
semantic place for the now necessary societal self-descriptions was the "state'1. And 
yet, due to the undecidability of those self-descriptions, it was possible, if not likely that 
several societal truths were produced. Society continued to partition itself and now 
began to institutionalize this partition. Several "states" emerged, whose truth claims 
remain hidden behind the assumption that they all are, however different, “states". The 
subsequent differentiation of governmental and administrative apparatuses soon led 
to a semantic distinction between "state" and “society". For the called for reflexiveness 
of government reflected a need for a functionally differentiated subsystem that would 
govern society according to its presumably intrinsic regularities. The newly 
differentiated political systems -- now plural! -  soon encountered, no surprise, the self­
reference behind those regularities as the paradox of self-limitation -- a paradox which 
is now a problem of the state as being distinct from society. The problem is discharged 
by the re-entry of society on the side of the state in form of the constitution, which 
now, in a sense, becomes the carrier of societal truth.39
6
The dynamics of the Cold War as the continuing dynamics of truthfulness, the 
persistence of the Cold War or, if you will, its “stability" as an expression and reflection 
of undecidability, and the outcome of the Cold War as an -- however temporal -- shift
Order 1648-1989. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1991), especially pp.25-70.
3“ See also Niklas Luhmann, Slaat und Politik: Zur Semantik der Selbstbeschreibung politischer 
Système, in Luhmann. Sozioloqische Aufklarunq 4. (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1987), pp.74-103, and 
Luhmann, Staat und Staatsrâson im Übergang von traditionaler Herrschaft zu modemer Politik, in Luhmann, 




























































































to the most resistant form under the prerogative of truthfulness: this, in very broad and 
simple terms, is what the Cold War looks like from the perspective of this essay. Of 
course, this interpretation can only serve as a starting point for a more detailed 
analysis; but this is its merit: it is a starting point.
7
At first, the Cold War was a self-description of society which saw itself evolving 
around or against another specific self-description -- communism. The Cold War was 
the result, then, of a self-observation of societal communication by means of the 
distinction communist/non-communist, which for all kinds of reasons was also 
represented by the binary code east/west. One of the many peculiarities of the Cold 
War is precisely this re-entry of the self-description into the self-description: in its self­
description society encountered more self-descriptions. In a sense, it was this 
recursiveness that made the Cold War unique among society’s self-descriptions at the 
time. Other themes, for example the North-South-conflict, did not evolve around 
societal self-descriptions. The North-South-conflict could all too easily be interpreted 
as a question of economic development and as such did not involve undecidability. If 
one really wanted, one could always do something about underdevelopment; yet the 
truth claim of communism could not be explained or argued away — it remained there. 
Once society’s self-observation observed two opposing self-descriptions, it seemed 
inevitable that both the search for truth and its undecidability would bring about a 
functionally differentiated social system that would somehow discharge, displace or 
simply administer the undecidable. After all, communication had to continue despite 
of society’s unresolved identity.
8
The hypothesis is, then, that the dynamics of truthfulness responded to the 




























































































The use of the code and the autocatalytic effects of the undecidability of the distinction 
it made, defined a truly autopoietic social system -- the Cold War. And just as a 
thermostat models a world as a hot/cold world, the Cold War system modeled its 
world, however imperfectly, as an east/west world. What makes the Cold War 
interesting also with regard to the general theory of autopoietic systems is the 
symmetry of this code: the code re-entered on both sides. Both “communist" and "non­
communist" communication were able to employ the code in their self-observation. The 
intensity of these procedures (McCarthyism!) may shed some light upon the dynamics 
of the system at large. I will refer to self-observing autopoietic systems employing 
symmetric codes as self-similar systems.40 The term should hint at the 
consequences for the system’s meaning world if it observes itself in terms of a 
symmetric code. For self-similar systems cannot escape from their code: whatever 
side of the code one picks and however deep one is to follow references from 
potentiality to potentiality, the possibility to process and assign meaning in terms of the 
code reappears. Self-similar systems are peculiar, I suggest, particularly with regard 
to the consequences of their dissolution. Social systems which observe themselves 
by means of an asymmetric code (see paragraph 12 in part I) may leave behind a 
body of information or knowledge consisting of communication that was assigned the 
positive value of the code. They accumulate "something" -- often without knowing 
what, why and how. In any case, these systems may have trajectories which may 
have meaning even if the code which produced it becomes discredited. In other words, 
these systems can be repaired if necessary. Self-similar systems, in contrast, dissolve 
at once with their code. They can hardly accumulate information which could provide 
guidance for further social autopoiesis and communication after the code's 
disappearance.
9
The simplicity of this definition of the Cold War as a system (!) which handled 
a specific form of societal self-observation will upset many historians. The Cold War,




























































































they will say, was much more than that. From the outset, it involved economic, 
technological, strategic, legal and many other issues. One should not underestimate, 
though, the complexity of the theory design of autopoiesis. To say that the system was 
defined by its code communist/non-communist (or its semantic equivalents) only 
means that a communication attached itself to and thereby constituted the Cold War 
system by employing this code. Communication may well use more than one code, 
but will then, as a single event, exist in more than one system and accordingly will 
have more than one past and more than one future. For example, the discovery of 
nuclear fission, as a single event, occurred in the system of science, in the economic 
system, in the legal system and certainly in the Cold War system. It had, then, at least 
four pasts and four futures. The history of science, for example, wilt treat nuclear 
fission differently than a history of the Cold War. To present the Cold War as a 
consequence of self-observation through the glasses of a binary code does not as yet 
say much about the social complexity that accompanied its existence. One may as 
well reflect on the complexity of science or law -- brought about by “simple" binary 
codes and structural coupling.
10
Once society discovered two apparently incompatible self-descriptions within its 
self-description, the search for truth and its undecidability made the differentiation of 
an autopoietic system such as the Cold War almost inevitable for at least two reasons. 
First, the observed inconsistencies made further and focused self-observation 
necessary; and second, as long as the inconsistencies were handled by a specifically 
designed system, the general communication could go on under hypotheses of 
normality. Functional differentiation always has ambiguous consequences. It 
simultaneously increases and decreases society’s dependence on the issues involved. 
Communication becomes independent in that it can communicate about everything 
while the functional subsystem takes care of society’s unresolved identity. Yet, 
functional differentiation also implies a loss of redundancy -- which is particularly 




























































































was immediately and -- in the strongest sense of the word -- existentially affected.41 
Functional differentiation means that society bundles a specific form of communication 
and thus assigns it to a (sub-)system, whose existence and autopoietic closure from 
then on structures social autopoiesis and communication at large. It means that, to a 
certain extent, the communications of the newly functionally differentiated system 
cannot be compensated or dispersed any longer by related noise in society -- for all 
this noise has now become focused. Functionally differentiated systems, in short, do 
not have counterparts with the same function:
11
Mainstream literature tries to understand the "stability" and persistence of the 
Cold War in terms of the absence of war between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. My framework suggests a distinction between the "stability" of the Cold War as 
a social system and between the maintenance of a certain kind of peace in society. 
The first issue involves the autopoietic closure of the system and its meaning world; 
the second is much wider in scope. With regard to the first question -- the Ccld War 
as a social system -- it is particularly striking that, although the system was noi 
expected to last for so long, the sense of surprise was great when it finally came to 
an end. The question is: how did the system exclude the possibility of its negation? 
This question also concerns the internal systemic time, i.e. the system’s time horizons. 
Flow did it, if it did, reflect on its future? Flow was the future present in the present? 
Or was it not? The system witnessed the uprising in Flungary in 1956, the spring in 
Prague in 1968; it witnessed events in Poland in the early 1980s, and still the 
possibility that similar events might at some point take place within the Soviet Union 
did not appear on the screen of the system until shortly before (after?) the events 
themselves.42 From the perspective of this essay, this sense of surprise is not at all
41 Note that the term "existential" here means something else than the survival of humans as organic 
and psychic systems.





























































































surprising. Decisive, again, was the undecidability of the issues involved. First, 
undecidability is the reason why the re-entry of two self-descriptions into the self­
description is a problem for the truthful society. And second, undecidability is the 
reason why it remains a problem despite of focused self-observation. A functional 
system which is supposed to (only) observe the undecidability can only reproduce the 
undecidability -  and this is, in a nutshell, the dynamics behind the autopoiesis of the 
Cold War. It could not observe beyond undecidability. In other words, within the logic 
of the Cold War, its end must be considered as illogical.
12
If one understands the outcome of the Cold War. the self-celebration of self- 
determination, as society’s move towards the most resistant form under the 
prerogative of truthfulness, then it seems plausible that society will accompany this 
move by declaring it the end of history.43 In fact, once truth retreated to its last resort 
and becomes self-renouncing, the truthful society does not have much choice in its 
claims. Since there is no fiction beyond the fiction of truth, the promotion of 
undecidability to the status of an attractor must be the end of history. And it seems 
likely that under these conditions the determination of the truthful society to defend its 
final truth will increase. The gigantic question-mark of history is whether it will succeed 
or for how long. Ironically, it is precisely this celebration of the end of history which 
reflects the continuity. It is precisely the "must” behind this end, or the very claim as 
such which reveals continuity.
13
This essay, to be sure, cannot do much more than to outline a perspective 
which puts the Cold War into context. I might have raised more questions than





























































































answered -- but I keep wondering whether other frameworks ever arrive at the 
questions posed here. In particular: society is fundamentally unknown to itself, but 
precisely this can be observed. And the decisive question is then whether and how 
society deals with the question-mark of its identity. How does it, if it does, generate 
and select self-descriptions? With what consequences? A social theory or, for that 
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